[Bf-committers] Python sandbox

Campbell Barton ideasman42 at gmail.com
Wed Mar 17 17:20:44 CET 2010

the problem is not so that someone would tamper with the python installation.
Its mainly that you can include malicious python code inside a blend
file in a driver or registered script.

On Wed, Mar 17, 2010 at 2:16 PM, Leif Andersen
<leif.a.andersen at gmail.com> wrote:
> I was thinking of submitting a GSoC proposal about this, although just a sub
> section of it, for as you point out, it is a rather large project.
> It would make sense to me, to include python, as a separate module when the
> user downloads blender.  It then checks to see if python has been installed
> on the system, if it hasn't, it will install it, if it has, it will use it
> (after checking to make sure that it hasn't been tampered with to the point
> where it's unusable).
> ~Leif Andersen
> On Wed, Mar 17, 2010 at 04:02, Campbell Barton <ideasman42 at gmail.com> wrote:
>> On Wed, Mar 17, 2010 at 9:50 AM, Ton Roosendaal <ton at blender.org> wrote:
>> > Hi all,
>> >
>> > In past discussions I had the impression that Blender's Python cannot
>> > be simply sandboxed because python.org doesn't cooperate with it.
>> > Second reason was that Blender apparently is one of the few apps
>> > embedding Python on such a level.
>> >
>> > Philipp Guehring sent me these links and a suggestion:
>> >
>> > http://sayspy.blogspot.com/2007/05/i-have-finished-securing-python.html
>> This would mean we would have to distribute blender with a totally
>> limited python, exporters, importers wouldnt work right. it also
>> removes functions we're relying on for some 2.5 internals.
>> > http://people.cs.ubc.ca/~drifty/papers/python_security.pdf<http://people.cs.ubc.ca/%7Edrifty/papers/python_security.pdf>
>> fairly easy to work around, edited namespace can be circumvented by...
>> f =  [ t for t in (1).__class__.__mro__[-1].__subclasses__() if
>> t.__name__ == 'file'][0]('/some_file.txt', 'w')
>> > http://svn.python.org/view/python/branches/bcannon-objcap/
>> apparently proof of concept sandbox branch of python, cant get info on
>> this easily, looks to be 2 years old.
>> > http://codespeak.net/pypy/dist/pypy/doc/sandbox.html
>> pypy cant be used since we rely on C/Python
>> >
>> http://lackingrhoticity.blogspot.com/2009/06/python-standard-library-in-native.html
>> Also cant be used because we need C/Python API
>> >
>> > Perhaps a Google SoC project to secure Blender's Python could help here.
>> >
>> > -Ton-
>> I'm not interested in this for a few reasons...
>> * Its a lot of work, even python guys have trouble to do this well and
>> there are way more python developers then blenders.
>> * If we had a totally sandboxed python this would limit scripts to the
>> point where scripts would not be able to do basic tasks (exporting,
>> writing files etc).
>> * If people start running a sandboxed blender this is a mode many
>> scripts need to support, a little like we had with 2.4x where we would
>> have to check if a fill python was installed, complain if it wasn't,
>> tell them to install etc.
>> if this goes ahead Id at least make sure it could be disabled at
>> compile time, but I really prefer it doesn't.
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- Campbell

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