[Bf-committers] Please turn off Auto Run Python Scripts by default

[Miika Hämäläinen]

IMHO the situation is clear: It's practically impossible to detect 
malicious scripts or make script execution fully safe. Implementing a 
safe scripting environment could be a nice long term target, but the 
main issue has to be addressed sooner. Therefore only solution is to 
inform users about a script before it's executed and prevent automatic 
execution by default.

If user trusts the source or expects the file to contain scripts then he 
is free to allow those scripts to run after the notification. If not 
then its his judgement to not trust the script (even if it came from 
official training DVD). There will be users who just click "allow" to 
any dialog we show but at that point it's really their issue not ours.

However, advanced users who care about their security should still be 
able to *open* (not necessarily execute) .blend files without having to 
scan them with some external script scanners or without having to ensure 
they remembered to disable auto-execution when they last time reverted 
to factory settings. :)

As already discussed in this thread, ideally the dialog would both 
indicate that the script can be dangerous but also note that the blend 
file likely won't function as intended without scripts. Naturally 
advanced users should be able to allow automatic execution of any 
scripts as well if they decide so.


Anyway, something has to be done. I mean seriously, how many Blender 
users even know there is such a setting? I didn't until last week. I 
always expected one would be safe to open .blend files until executing 
those scripts manually... Right now anyone can create a malicious blend, 
upload it online combined with a nice scene and it executes on 99% of 
users systems without them ever knowing that their personal documents 
were just uploaded online.


9.6.2013 12:54, Campbell Barton wrote:
> On Sun, Jun 9, 2013 at 5:37 PM, Knapp<magick.crow at gmail.com>  wrote:
>>>> Sure, not everyone's a programmer that can inspect the scripts, but at some point I feel the responsibility lies with the users and with the sites offering the .blends to inform them of potential dangers, and not so much with the BF trying to create a super-safe environment. Super-safe in this case translating to crippled or unusable for some.
>>> I think you under estimate how easy it is to hide code in a blend
>>> file, at the risk of giving people bad ideas...
>> I like a lock on a door with windows all over the house, adding some
>> code to blender to stop viruses will never be perfect but it will stop
>> the neighborhood kid from breaking in. Just knowing that blender has
>> some protection will slow down most virus attacks or stop them from
>> ever even trying. We will never be able to stop governments or other
>> pros from attacking the program but that does not mean we should not
>> lock the door.
> It seems like you reply to a different point?
>
> I'm only saying that its not so fair to expect users to be able to
> open a blend and check for malicious python scripts.
>
> We could have some tool that extracts scripts from a blend (so at
> least hiding isn't so much an issue), but this isn't really a
> solution, just a tool that helps in certain situations.
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