[Bf-committers] Please turn off Auto Run Python Scripts by default

Fri Jun 7 18:15:22 CEST 2013

I just want Blender to ask me at loading time, if I want to run scripts or
not. Obviously option should be a user preference.

At loading time you can then reply:

1) run script this time
2) don't run scripts this time
3) always run scripts and don't nag/ask me ever again
4) never run scripts and don't nag/ask me ever again

That is a very simple starting point to better manage security I think.
Thanks,
Erwin

On 7 June 2013 09:03, Ton Roosendaal <ton at blender.org> wrote:

> Hi Shrinidhi,
>
> > Why not have a script that ships with blender, which can be run
> > individually,  which checks the blender file for scripts  and informs the
> > user if it is malicious or safe ?
>
> That's interesting to check, but I don't like to make users responsible
> for checking each .blend they want to load. My preference is a way that's
> relatively safe and works out of the box for everyone (except system
> administrators :).
>
> > 1 : Changing blenders default behavior for running scripts is like
> killing
> > a few scripters in studios using blender.
>
> That is only true if we stick to how it works now. We can find ways to
> either force scripts to become add-ons or to mark .blend files or scripts
> as trusted for own use and studios.
>
> -Ton-
>
> --------------------------------------------------------
> Ton Roosendaal  -  ton at blender.org   -   www.blender.org
> Chairman Blender Foundation - Producer Blender Institute
> Entrepotdok 57A  -  1018AD Amsterdam  -  The Netherlands
>
>
>
> On 7 Jun, 2013, at 16:37, Shrinidhi Rao wrote:
>
> > On Fri, Jun 7, 2013 at 4:42 PM, Ton Roosendaal <ton at blender.org> wrote:
> >
> >> Hi all Pythoneers,
> >>
> >> Scripters are important for Blender, but just like the C developers they
> >> have a responsibility for users out there. A good proposal for security
> has
> >> to come from you as experts first.
> >>
> >
> > Why not have a script that ships with blender, which can be run
> > individually,  which checks the blender file for scripts  and informs the
> > user if it is malicious or safe ?
> > The script can have a way to update a set of rules that marks the files
> > safe or unsafe. May be blender institute can maintain a database and the
> > script will auto-update the rules.
> > People responsible for the python API can keep updating the database
> > incrementally.
> >
> > Now why a different script? .
> > 1 : Changing blenders default behavior for running scripts is like
> killing
> > a few scripters in studios using blender.
> > 2 : it can be run individually by the security conscious people . at
> least
> > they will have a way to check if a blend file is evil or good .
> > 3: for large deployments it can be run in batch mode to check multiple
> > files at once .
> >
> >
> > This way we can make the users happy . at least they will have a way to
> > tell what the blend file is up to .
> > In a studio we need not worry about it as there are proper user
> permissions
> > and policies already implemented.
> >
> >
> >
> >>
> >> If this discussion just leads to marking every idea as impossible
> (Python
> >> is insecure by design) then we should have a big problem with keeping
> >> Python in Blender. Fork it, sandbox it, or move to LUA.
> >>
> >> This is not at all constructive! .
> > Arguing against using python and replacing it with a crippled scripting
> > language is as good as telling professional studios users to stop using
> > blender directly. it will not help blender in anyway. first thing they
> see
> > is how can data be interchanged between softwares . no studio will dump
> > their existing softwares and start using blender entirely for all their
> > production stages . blender should be able to communicate with other
> > software and a restricted scripting language will not help blender or its
> > users.
> >
> > as it is, i am already feeling crippled without a socket based command
> port
> > in blender . there is no way to send a command to blender like opening
> > files, linking etc! . well . this is not needed if we have only a blender
> > specific pipeline. but if we want to keep our pipeline UI out of blender
> > then its very useful
> >
> >
> >
> >> Let it be clear: we're making Blender here, which is meant to be a 3D
> >> creation tool. It's not a Python development environment. Users come
> first,
> >> scripters and coders second. So... stop being smartasses and think
> >> constructive a bit.
> >>
> >>
> > A 3D creation tool without a powerfull scripting api is useless nowadays,
> > at least for professional users.
> > Users come first . yes.. i totally agree with you . but the users always
> > improve and always want more out the software once they become aware that
> > they can do certain things in blender . And the same users who wanted too
> > much security will be annoyed by the same security measures once they
> come
> > out of their hobbyist attitude and become scripters and coders.
> >
> >
> >
> >> -Ton-
> >>
> >> --------------------------------------------------------
> >> Ton Roosendaal  -  ton at blender.org   -   www.blender.org
> >> Chairman Blender Foundation - Producer Blender Institute
> >> Entrepotdok 57A  -  1018AD Amsterdam  -  The Netherlands
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On 7 Jun, 2013, at 12:08, Domino Marama wrote:
> >>
> >>> On 06/07/2013 10:21 AM, Ton Roosendaal wrote:
> >>>> Hi Campbell,
> >>>>
> >>>> I don't know enough about Python internals, so I depend on someone to
> >> help designing a sane way to handle security risks here. There must be
> ways
> >> we can help users?
> >>>>
> >>>> Look for example at the standard UI scripts. Apart from 1 case,
> there's
> >> no "import os" anywhere. Same goes for essential scripts riggers or
> >> animators use.
> >>>>
> >>>> So, why not add a provision in Blender code to check on such cases.
> >> Just don't allow import of any module = safe script? In all other cases:
> >> needs to be explicitly permitted to run.
> >>>>
> >>>> Something like this would make a "trusted source" option on file
> >> loading more useful. Right now, unticking "trusted source" is almost
> >> equivalent to "disable useful features".
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>>> oh = 'SOS HELP!'
> >>>>>> ohoh = __import__(oh[1:3].lower())
> >>>>>> ohoh
> >>> <module 'os' from
> >>>
> >>
> '/home/domino/Applications/blender-2.67-linux-glibc211-x86_64/2.67/python/lib/python3.3/os.py'>
> >>>
> >>> On Linux distros where system Python is used, I doubt anything can be
> >>> done to prevent the import function from being used.
> >>>
> >>> Load Blender with a console, check there's the startup message on it.
> >>> Then paste this into say the frame number field..
> >>>
> >>> eval("__import__('os').system('clear')", {})
> >>>
> >>> Now check console again.. Just checking scripts for imports isn't
> enough.
> >>> _______________________________________________
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> >>> Bf-committers at blender.org
> >>> http://lists.blender.org/mailman/listinfo/bf-committers
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
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> >>
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> >
> > regards
> > - shrinidhi
> >
> >
> > Even god fails to understand a human until his death!
> > http://www.linkedin.com/in/shrinidhi666
> > https://github.com/shrinidhi666
> >
> >
> >
> > <http://www.imdb.com/name/nm3025616>
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